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NIXON'S LEGACY TO THE SUPREME COURT:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
S.

SIDNEY ULMER*

,

JOHN A. STOOKEY**

I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Nixon Presidency came to a halt in 1974, Richard
Nixon's legacy to the Supreme Court continues. With the appointment of William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell to the Supreme Court
in 1971, President Nixon had made four appointments to the Court
in the relatively short period of three years.' This unusually large
turnover in Justices and the fact that candidate Nixon had made such
a major issue of the need for a more conservative Court during his
1968 campaign combined to heighten interest in the impact that
these new Justices would have upon the output of the Court. While
the greatest interest in an appointee's impact is likely to manifest
itself in the early part of a Justice's tenure, lifetime appointment assures that the influence of the appointee on Court decisions is long
lasting. This article represents an attempt to derive some initial inferences regarding the Nixon legacy by examining the behavior of
his appointees in selected cases. The cases used are those involving
conflicts between the government and an individual decided
during the 1971, 1972, and 1973 terms. Data on other Justices and
from other cases are introduced for comparative purposes and for
use in formulating a theoretical context for understanding decisionmaking at the level of the individual Justice.
After the 1968 election, President Nixon explained one of his
campaign pledges as follows:
[D]uring my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to nominate
to the Supreme Court individuals who shared my judicial philosophy
Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky. B.A., Furman
1952; M.A., Duke University, 1954, Ph.D., 1956.

University,

0* Ph.D. candidate, University of Kentucky. A.B., Marshall University, 1971, M.A.,
1973.
1. Over the 185-year history of the Supreme Court, a Justice has been appointed
to the Court on the average of once every two years. Thus Nixon should have had to
wait eight years to make four appointments, rather than only three years.
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which is basically a conservative philosophy....
As a judicial conservative, I believe some Court decisions in
the past have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against
2
the criminal forces in our society.
Thus Nixon equated judicial conservatism with support of the government in criminal casesA Such a definition is congruent with the concept of conservatism employed by political scientists who study judicial
behavior. In the literature, criminal cases are considered as one type
of civil liberties case. In criminal cases as well as all other civil
liberties cases, a conservative vote is operationalized as a vote which
upholds the.claim of the government as against the individual.4 Thus
there is little difference between Nixon's concept of conservatism and
that used in the professional literature, except that the latter is broader in scope. Therefore, at a very simplistic operational level, we can
conclude that Nixon's desire to appoint "conservative" Justices was
a desire to appoint Justices who would support the government to a
statistically significant degree in criminal cases.
In a recent book on the Supreme Court, James Simon concluded
that "Richard Nixon . . . has succeeded in dissolving a Warren Court
that was the nation's premier symbol for progressive leadership for
more than a decade."5 An alternative hypothesis from a Nixonian
perspective might be that Richard Nixon succeeded in building a
Court that is strengthening the "peace forces" and weakening the
"criminal forces" in American society. Those who are strong civil
libertarians might be expected to associate with the first proposition.
Those who stress efficient suppression of crime would likely opt for
the second.6 While both statements suggest that President Nixon,
through his Supreme Court appointments, brought change to the
policymaking of the Court, neither is an explanation of that change.
Simon suggests that the Court's recent performance in the criminal
justice field is explained by the formula, 4N + X = LAO, 7 i.e. four
2. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 4.
3. For further indication of President Nixon's equation of judicial conservativism
and support of the government in criminal cases, see New York Times, Nov. 3, 1968,
§ 1, at 79, col. 3.
4.

See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL

MIND 125-58

(1965).

5. J. SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE 288 (1973).
6. The ramifications of these conflicting views of the criminal process are considered in H. PACKER, THE LiMiTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). Packer constructs
a "crime control model" and a "due process model" of the criminal process, and attempts to ascertain where our present criminal process falls on the spectrum between
those models.
7. J. SIMON, supra note 5, at 253.
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TABLE I
VOTING PATTERNS OF 15 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
IN GRANTING CERTIORARI REVIEW OF STATE CRIMINAL CASES:

VARYING PERIODS (1947-56 TERMS)

Justice

Period

Number of
Applications for
Review of
Government
Victory Below

Murphy
Whittaker
Douglas
Rutledge
Black
Brennan
Warren*
Frankfurter
Harlan
Burton
Clark
Vinson*
Jackson
Reed
Minton

1947-48
1956
1947-56
1947-48
1947-56
1956
1953-56
1947-56
1955-56
1947-56
1949-56
1947-52
1947-53
1947-56
1949-55

29
12
198
32
212
22
88
217
72
218
184
126
135
205
160

% Decisions
Favorable to
Criminal Suspect
(Cert. Granted)
57.63
50.00
48.49
43.75
38.68
36.37
27.28
21.66
20.84
20.65
17.40
15.88
14.85
13.18
10.00

* Chief Justices

Nixon appointees plus the unknown (Justice White or Stewart)
equals law and order decisions favorable to prosecutors or police.8
While this formula may contain an element of truth, it is atheoretical at
all but the least sophisticated level. This article explores empirically
the question of behavioral antecedents and delineates a theoretical
framework in which the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices
can be understood. While our analysis is more general in nature than
that of Simon, it will suggest that the theoretical reasons for the
behavior of the Nixon appointees to the Court are more complex than
the peapod implications of the Simon formula.
II.

DIFFERENCES AMONG SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

While references to the "Nixon Justices" are commonplace, it is
certainly possible that the four Nixon appointees are not equally
in Nixon's image, but differ among themselves. Behavior disparities
among Justices are not unusual. For example, as Tables I and II reveal, Justices are not equally inclined to grant certiorari applications
8.

Id.
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TABLE II
VOTING PATrMNS OF 15 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
IN GRANTING CERTIORARI REVIEW OF FEDERAL

CRIMINAL CASES: VARYING PERIODS (1947-56 TERMS)

Justice

Period

Number of
Applications for
Review of
Government
Victory Below

Black
Douglas
Murphy
Rutledge
Frankfurter
Brennan
Warren*
Harlan
Jackson
Reed
Clark
Burton
Whittaker
Vinson*
Minton

1947-56
1947-56
1947-48
1947-48
1947-56
1956
1953-56
1955-56
1947-53
1947-56
1949-56
1947-56
1956
1947-52
1949-55

142
141
6
6
141
18
88
76
59
132
129
142
6
50
84

% Decisions
Favorable to
Criminal Suspect
(Cert. Granted)
50.70
50.06
50.00
50.00
34.75
33.34
27.27
26.31
25.40
20.96
18.60
16.90
16.67
16.00
13.67

* Chief Justices

of criminal defendants. 9 Justices also differ in the frequency with
which they find for the criminal defendant in those cases where certiorari is granted. To take extreme examples, in the 1947-56 terms,
Justice Minton found for the criminal defendant 22.6 percent of the
time in federal criminal cases and 22.4 percent of the time in state
cases. Douglas, on the other hand, found for the defendant at a level
of 75.1 percent in federal cases and 88.1 percent in state cases. The
Court as a body, during this same period, held for the defendant
46.1 percent of the time in federal criminal proceedings and 56.6 percent of the time in state criminal proceedings.
Chief Justices also differ in their support of criminal defendants.
This is evident from a comparison between Chief Justices Warren and
Vinson in Tables I and II and also from the following comparison
between Chief Justices Warren and Burger. In his entire tenure, Earl
Warren decided in favor of the criminal defendant in 81 percent of
the criminal cases in which he participated. From his appointment in
9. Further discussion of these phenomena may be found in Ulmer, Supreme Court
Justices as Strict and Not-So-Strict Constructionists: Some Implications, 8 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 13 (1973).
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1969 through June 1974, Warren Burger supported the defendant in
only 20 percent of the criminal cases decided.
Courts as a body also differ. Table III provides a comparison of
the decisions in favor of the criminal defendants in the Vinson (19471952), Warren (1953-1968) and Burger (1971-1973) courts. The table
reveals the extent to which the Warren Court differed from the
Courts preceding and following it in supporting the claims of criminal
defendants. In general, the criminal defendant had a one-third chance
that the Vinson Court would find in his favor, a two-thirds chance with
the Warren Court, and, to date, has less than a one-half chance with
the Burger Court. In all three Courts it was statistically less likely
that the defendant would win a case against the federal government
than against a state. However, the difference is less in the Warren
Court than in Courts of the other two Chief Justices.
A comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts reveals that the
Burger Court has found for defendants at a rate of about 21 percent
below that of the Warren Court. The Burger Court appears to be
moving back to the pre-Warren Court rate of holdings for the defendant. While it has not yet regressed that far, it is much closer to
the Vinson Court than to the Warren Court. The figures may be somewhat misleading, however, given the far-reaching decisions in the
criminal justice area in the 1953-69 period. The Burger Court, while
showing a willingness to slow the expansion of rights and nibble at
the basic precedents of the Warren era, has not shown any drive to
undo completely all the change brought about by the previous Court.

III.

THE BURGER COURT: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The fact that Justices, Chief Justices, and Courts differ in their
inclination to find for the criminal defendant suggests the possibility
that the four Nixon appointees may also differ in spite of Nixon's
attempt to appoint Justices who would help each other to reduce the
Court's inclination to find for criminal defendants. Moreover, even
if one or more of the Nixon Justices is found to vote in favor of the
government in criminal cases to a statistically significant degree, we
cannot necessarily explain that voting pattern as reflecting solely the
Justice's attitude toward criminal defendants. It is possible that support
of the government in criminal cases is only one manifestation of a
more fundamental attitudinal dimension: support of institutionalized
governmental authority. In other words, it may be hypothesized that
the attitude which leads a Justice to vote to expand the scope of institutionalized governmental authority in the context of criminal law
10.

Id.
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will lead to a similar result in noncriminal areas. One of the authors
has suggested as much in a different context.' He determined that
during the 1947-1956 terms of the Court, those Justices who supported
the government on certiorari applications also supported the government in deciding criminal cases.
L. L. Thurstone, who pioneered the psychological study of attitudinal structure, defines an attitude as the "degree of positive or
negative effect associated with some psychological object.",' He defines a psychological object as "any symbol, phrase, slogan, person, institution, ideal, or idea toward which people can differ with respect
to positive or negative effect. ' ' 12 For the data analyzed here, the major
attitude object (AO)"s is conceptualized as conflict between individual
and government. External behavior, however, is not merely a function
of attitudes toward objects. It is also the function of the situation in
which the object is located. This is referred to as the attitude situation (AS).' 4 With respect to conflict between individuals and institutionalized governmental authority, criminal and noncriminal cases
are separate categories of situational variables in which a Justice is
forced to respond to the question of governmental authority. In
other words, there are at least two different situations in which
government and individual may be involved in legal conflict. These
different situational variables (criminal cases, and noncriminal cases
in which the government is a litigant) may cause the Justice to react
differently to the attitude object (government-individual conflict), or
the situational variables may be dominated by the Justice's attitudes
toward the object. In the latter case, the decisional propensities toward
the attitude object would be consistent in both attitude situations.
The question in its simplest form is, when a Justice finds for the
11.
12.

Thurstone, Comment, 51 AM. J. Soc. 52 (1946).
Id. See A. EDWARDS, TECHNIQUES OF ATrITUDE SCALE CONSTRUCTION 2 (1957).

13.

See generally M.

ROKEACH,

The Nature of Attitudes, in

INTERNATIONAL

EN-

449 (1968).
14. Id. Rokeach discusses the importance of the distinction between AO and AS
and argues that behavior is a function of both of these factors. The logic of this
distinction can be seen in a simple example. It is not sufficient to know merely a
person's feelings toward blacks (the AO). It is also necessary to know the situation (AS)
in which the black is encountered in order to predict behavior. For example, a person's
attitude toward a black may be very different in a situation where the black is a fellow
worker (AS,), from his attitude in a situation where the black is moving into the neighborhood (AS2 ). For a further discussion of this distinction and its importance in predicting behavior, see M. ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ArrITUDES AND VALUES 126-29 (1968).
This idea has been adapted to the study of the judiciary in H. Spaeth, A Theory
and Methodology for the Explanation and Prediction of Supreme Court Decisions (unpublished manuscript). See also Spaeth, Meltz, Rathjen, & Haselswerdt, Is Justice Blind:
An Empirical Investigation of a Normative Ideal, 7 LAW & Soc'y REV. 119 (1972).
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
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government in a criminal case, is he doing so because of a tendency
to favor the government whenever it is a litigant opposing an individual
or only when a criminal defendant is involved?
A. Operationalization
At the operational level, the preceding discussion suggests that
by appointing Justices who support the government to a significant
degree in criminal cases, Nixon also appointed men whose bias toward
institutionalized authority would cause them to support government
in other areas. More generally, we hypothesize that all Justices who
support the government at a statistically significant level in criminal
cases (AS1) will support the government at a statistically significant
level in noncriminal cases (AS,). 1 5 Our hypothesis refers only to cases
involving the attitude object specified above-those cases involving
conflict between individual and government. At first blush, this theory
appears to conflict with the psychometric theory of judicial decisionmaking. By scaling civil liberties (C) and economic enterprise (E) as
two distinct attitude situations,'16 some authors have concluded that
the Justices do not have a single attitude that dominates both attitudinal situations. 1 7 Conversely, we hypothesize that the attitude
situations of criminal cases, which are part of the civil liberties (C)
scale, and those of noncriminal cases, which include cases from both
the economic enterprise (E) and civil liberties (C) scales, are dominated by a single attitude toward the object of conflict between institutionalized governmental authority and individuals.
The government cases which constitute the universe of cases for
the theory here do not constitute all of the cases which make up the
C and E scales. The C and E scales also include cases solely between
private litigants. Therefore, studies which show that the C and E
scales do not form a unidimensional array are not necessarily disconfirming. The array of cases selected for presence of the attitude
object that we hypothesize has not been tested for dimensionality. In
short, the presence of nongovernment cases in C and E scales possibly

15. For two earlier studies dealing with support of the federal government by the
Justices, see Canon & Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies Before the Supreme
Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183 (1972); Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal
Administrative Agencies: 1947-1956-An Application of Social Science Methods to the
Study of the Judicial Process, 14 VAND. L. REv. 473, 482-502 (1961).
16. For an interesting and nontechnical overview of the concept of C and E scales,
see S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTM 159-67 (1971).
17. See Ulmer, The Dimensionality of Judicial Voting Behavior, 13 M.W.J. POL.
Sci. 471 (1969).
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obscures the unidimensionality present in conflicts only between the
government and private individuals.
B. Data Analysis
In qualitative terms, the direction of the movement in constitutional law which the Nixon Justices seek is clear: they seem determined
to reduce the pre-trial rights of criminal defendants and have already
moved more than a few steps in that direction. For example, policemen have been given greater freedom of action in stop and frisk
cases.' The latitude of the policemen to conduct a search incident
to a valid arrest has been expanded.' 9 And the Court held in 1972 that
the right to presence of counsel at police lineups is limited to lineups conducted after indictment.20 While such examples are easily
multiplied, a clearer picture will emerge from the empirical analysis
to which we now turn.
In order to determine whether AS, (criminal law context) and AS,
(noncriminal law cases in which the government is a litigant) are
dominated by AO (conflict between government and individual) a comparison of the votes favoring the government in criminal and noncriminal cases in which government is a litigant has been made. The
results are reported in Table IV. The question which the table
addresses is whether the Justices have distinguished between criminal
and noncriminal cases in supporting the government's position. The
contingency coefficient (C), column seven, measures the degree of the
association between the two dichotomized variables, support nonsupport and criminal cases noncriminal cases.2 That association is
18. Compare Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
19. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
20. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
21. The contingency coefficient (C) allows us to determine if an observed relationship between two variables is a function of an actual correlation between the variables
or is merely due to chance. This is done by determining what frequencies would occur in
each cell (Columns 2-5 in Table IV) if there were no association or correlation between
the two variables. (In Table IV the two variables are support for government and
type of case: criminal or noncriminal.) The larger the difference between these expected
values and the observed cell values, the larger the degree of association between the
two variables and thus the higher is the value of C. For a further discussion of this
statistic, see H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 230 (1960). See also Tanenhaus, supra note 15.
It should be noted that the C is particularly applicable in determining the association between dichotomous variables, such as those considered in this article. A dichotomous
variable is one which is divided into two classes. For example, the variable sex is
dichotomous in that it can be divided into two classes: male and female. Similarly,
each of the variables in this paper is divided into two classes: support and non-support
for government; and criminal and noncriminal cases.
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statistically significant at the .05 level only for Justice Powell.2 2 This
indicates that Powell's support for the government is dominated by
the two attitude situations rather than a general attitude toward
government-individual conflict, and that the associations reported are
unlikely to be chance results.
The association for Powell is not very strong. A lambda coefficient,
which measures the strength of a relationship, was computed for this
Justice and found to be zero. 23 Therefore the percentage of improvement in the extent to which the rate of support for government by
Powell can be predicted by knowing whether the case is criminal or
noncriminal is zero. Nevertheless, the weak relationship does exist
and we infer initially that the AO (conflict between government and
individual) is dominant over the situational variables for eight of the
nine Justices.
We do not know from Table IV whether support for the government in either set of cases is significantly above the group mean for
any given Justice.2 4 By comparing criminal and noncriminal cases
separately we can answer that question and determine whether
differences in support levels occur across the two situations. This
analysis reveals that in criminal cases Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, and
Blackmun have supported the government to a statistically significant
degree above the group mean while Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas
22. For a comment on "chance result" or "statistical significance" see note 25, infra.
23. Lambda is a measure of association between two nominal variables. If one
views association as a problem in guessing, then variables may be said to be associated
if knowledge of one improves ability to "guess" the other. The lambda coefficient measures
the extent to which such improvement occurs when knowledge of a second variable is
introduced. For example, if, as in Table IV, we know that Chief Justice Burger supported government more often than not (157 to 63), the maximum error if we guess support
for government in all cases is 63 or 28.6%. But if we know Burger's votes in both
criminal and noncriminal cases, and "guess" support in terms of the modal (larger)
category in each case, we would make 41 plus 22 for a total of 63 errors. Obviously,
we cannot improve our estimate of Burger's support ratio by having knowledge of
whether the votes are cast in criminal or noncriminal cases. This is another way of
saying that no association was found between supporting the government and the
criminal or noncriminal context of the case. For a more complete discussion of lambda
as a measure of association, see L. FREEMAN, ELEMENTARY APPLIED STATISTICS FOR STUDENTS
SCIENcE 71-78 (1965).
24. As was discussed in note 21 supra, measures of association are constructed by
determining the deviance of observed frequencies from those expected by chance. In
this particular section we are using as the expected frequency the group mean. This
mean is merely the average support rate for all of the Justices. This figure is being
used as the expected frequency upon the logic that if there is no difference between the
Justices' AO's and AS's, each should vote the same in all cases, and that this same
voting pattern should be reflected in the group mean. Thus, to the extent that the
various Justices deviate from this mean, we may conclude that there are significant
differences among them.
IN BEHAVIORAL
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have supported the criminal defendant at equally significant levels.
Table V indicates that the four Nixon appointees have supported the
government in criminal cases roughly 67 to 81 percent of the time.
Three of the Warren Court holdovers-Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas
-have supported the government in the same cases at levels ranging
from 9 to 23 percent. The difference between the means of these
two groups is statistically significant at .001. In civil cases, Table V
indicates that Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun continue to support
the government at levels significantly above the group mean while
Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas do so at levels significantly below
the group mean. Again the difference between the means for these
two groups is significant at .001.
TABLE V
ANALYSIS OF VOTES FAVORING GOVERNMENT OVER INDIVIDUAL

(1971-73

TERMS)

Justice

% for Gov't
in Criminal
Cases

Probability That
This Is a Chance
Result*

% for Gov't
in Noncriminal
Cases

Probability That
This Is a Chance
Result*

Rehnquist
Burger
Blackmun
Powell
White
Stewart
Brennan
Marshall
Douglas

81.1
70.8
66.7
70.4
57.6
60.8
22.7
16.2
8.6

.01
.01
.01
.01
.20
.50+
.01
.01
.01

79.7
72.5
62.5
55.6
44.4
43.9
16.2
13.9
8.7

.01
.01
.05
.20
.50+
.50+
.01
.01
.01

2
By chi square using group mean percentage to calculate expected value. 5

From the comparisons made, we may infer that attitude toward
government-individual conflict dominates attitude toward situation for
Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun (favorable) and for Brennan, Mar25. The columns headed "Probability That This Is a Chance Result" in Table V
report the likelihood that the difference between observed and expected support for
government, Justice by Justice, is a consequence of a sampling variation from a population of cases in which no such difference exists. Traditionally, a probability of less
than five in a hundred leads the social scientist to infer that the difference is not due
to sampling variation. In this case, the expected support is the average or mean support
given government by all the Justices. Thus, for example, Rehnquist's support of
government in 81.1% of the criminal cases studied is far above the average support
provided by a Justice. The deviation is such that it could occur by chance less than
one time in a hundred. Thus we would infer, initially, that some non-chance factor is
operative in shaping Rehnquist's voting pattern in these cases. The chi square formula
by which the probability coefficients in Table V are derived is X2 = 1[(O-E)2 - El,
where X2 refers to chi square, Y is a summation sign, 0 is the observed frequency, and
E is the expected frequency. For a more complete discussion see L. FREEMAN, sUpra
note 23, at Chapter 18.

1975]

JUDICIAL BEHA VIOR

shall, and Douglas (unfavorable). We infer further that White and
Stewart, in deciding cases involving the government and an individual,
are influenced by considerations other than those we are considering.
Table V indicates that these Justices' voting patterns are as nearly attributable to chance result as to the variables under study. Finally,
we infer that for Justice Powell, the particular type of case is dominant
over general attitude toward government-individual conflict. While
Powell supports the government to a statistically significant degree in
all cases involving conflicts between government and individuals, that
support is statistically significant in criminal, but not noncriminal,
cases. Our hypothesis, therefore, cannot be rejected for Rehnquist,
Burger, and Blackmun. It can be rejected for Powell. Contrary to
what might have been expected, this Justice, normally considered the
most liberal of those appointed by President Nixon, appears to be
the only one of four appointees who is allowing the criminal context
26
of the case to influence his votes for governmental authority.
The support patterns of Brennan, Marshall and Douglas are
sufficiently skewed in the direction of voting against the government
that Nixon was perhaps justified in pointing to their remarkable deviation from normal expectations. However, if the President read
these patterns to mean some particular sympathy for criminal defendants, he may have been misled. For Douglas, Marshall, and
Brennan, attitude toward government-individual conflict seems to have
dominated both types of cases. These three Justices seem to have
little sympathy for institutionalized authority as a litigant whether
the context is a criminal or noncriminal case.
Given the relationships we have portrayed, it is legitimate to ask
whether they are affected by other intervening variables. Here We
look at only one such variable-whether the authority is state government or federal government. If governmental authority in conflict with
the individual is the correct attitude object in our analysis, there is
no particular reason to expect that differentiating such authority as
between state and federal levels will affect the relationships portrayed.
Analysis of criminal cases at two levels of government shows no
significant association between the voting patterns and the level of
governmental authority. For the noncriminal cases, of the six Justices
whose attitude toward government-individual conflict was dominant,
only Brennan distinguishes state and local authority from federal authority. The distinction is significant at the .01 level, with Brennan
being considerably more "hostile" to state power (two votes for the
26. The inference for Powell is arguable given the weakness of the relation be.
tween his voting behavior and the context in which his votes were cast. It may be
accepted as tentative until additional data and analysis clarify the situation further.
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state in 51 chances) than to federal power (11 votes for the federal
government in 29 chances).
There is nothing here to disturb the basic inferences that Justices
Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun are object dominated while Powell
is situation dominated, even though President Nixon might have
chosen all on the belief that they were situation dominated in criminal
cases. The fact that object dominance in criminal cases has provided
the results Nixon sought at the practical level should not be allowed
to obscure the theoretical dimensions of the behavior we are now
observing in the Supreme Court.
The theory we have examined appears to explain the voting behavior of six of the nine Justices (excluding Powell, White, and
Stewart). Each seems to have an attitude toward the object-conflict between institutionalized governmental authority and the individual-that dominates the two contextual situations examined and
allows for consistent support for government or individual across issue
areas. As a final method of testing this general proposition, consider
the internal consistency of the support scores of the six Justices. It is
clear that Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun did not support the government at exactly the same level in both attitude
situations. Similarly, identical levels of support for the individual
were not found for Justices Marshall, Brennan and Douglas in criminal
and noncriminal cases. However, if our theory is correct, we should
find that deviations across situations are small enough to be attributed
to chance. If the support level for a Justice across situations varies
more than could be expected by chance, we would be forced to conclude that the attitude situation is having a significant effect upon his
decisional propensities and that his attitude toward the object is not
completely dominant.
The hypothesis to be tested here is that there is no significant
difference between the support levels recorded in each situation by
each of our six Justices. An appropriate method for testing this hypothesis is the difference of proportions test. Simply put, this test allows
us to determine if the voting patterns of the various Justices vary
significantly with the situations involved. 27 Table VI reports the results of this analysis.

27. At a more sophisticated level, we may explain the difference of proportions
test as follows. This test allows for the dyadic comparison of the two attitude situations
for each of the six Justices and enables us to determine whether the differences in
support level found are due to chance. The test permits the conversion of the dyadic
deviations to Z scores, which in turn facilitate the evaluation of the differences with
respect to the area under the normal curve. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 21, at 176.
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TABLE VI
CONSISTENCY

OF THE SIX JUSTICES WHOSE VOTES ARE

By ATTITUDE TOWARD

GOVERNMENTAL-INDIVIDUAL

CONFLICT

SIGNIFICANTLY

INFLUENCED

(DIFFERENCE OF PROPORTIONS

TEST) Criminal and Noncriminal Case Situations Paired

Justice

Z Score

StatisticalSignificance

Rehnquist
Burger
Blackmun
Marshall
Brennan
Douglas

.666
.269
.631
.431
1.148
.051

>.20
>.35
>.25
>.30
>.10
>.30

As can be seen, for each Justice the statistical significance is greater
than .10. This means that the deviation from our hypothesized voting
behavior for each Justice across attitude situations can be attributed
to chance. At the theoretical level, this lends further credence to the
argument that a general attitude toward government-individual conflict is sufficiently strong to dominate the individual attitude situation
for these six Justices.
IV.

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

It has been suggested that Supreme Court Justices often differ
in the way they relate to the decisions they are required to make
and that such differences cannot be explained by differences in the
appointing President. For the current Court, the Justices have been
found to differ among themselves in deciding criminal cases involving
the individual versus the government during the 1971-73 terms. Three
Justices (Douglas, Marshall and Brennan) were unusually favorable
to the individual while four (Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist) were extremely favorable to government. Since the latter group
was appointed solely by President Nixon, the possibility existed that
all were "in his image" or mirror images of each other. The other
three Justices, however, were appointed by three different Presidents.
The similarities in their voting patterns, therefore, could not be due
to appointment of three fungible Justices by an ideologically calculating President. This and related knowledge about behavior variation
among Justices suggested that a more refined analysis might reveal
differences among the Nixon appointees.
On the assumption that the differences noted were attitudinally
based, we theorized that the voting patterns of seven Justices (excluding White and Stewart) reflected their attitude toward an object (AO)
and that the object was that classic conflict between institutionalized
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governmental authority and the individual citizen. To test the proposition that an attitude object (AO) was responsible for the votes
cast in criminal cases, we examined a second attitude situation (AS),
noncriminal cases involving the individual and the government.
Though the direction of the votes differed, the AO hypothesis was
found explanatory for six of the seven Justices. Burger, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun consistently favored government in both attitude situations.
Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan were all consistent in supporting the
claims of individuals in both situations. The seventh Justice, Powell,
was not consistent in the two decisional contexts, leading to the inference that, for him, attitude toward situation dominated attitude
toward object. Thus, the Nixon appointees were not found to be mirror
images of one another.
This conclusion for the six Justices is incompatible with the notion
that these Justices have merely reflected in their voting a hard or soft
approach to the narrow situation of "law and order" themes or "the
criminal forces" in our midst. Its theoretical significance pertains to
our understanding of judicial behavior. But practical and theoretical
elements are inseparably intertwined with appointing Presidents. A
President who seeks to change the direction of Court decisions in a
given area by judicious selection of Justices, but who limits his analysis
of their background to a single dimension of behavior, may succeed
insofar as that unidimensional perspective is concerned. President
Nixon wanted Justices who would be more favorably inclined to support government in criminal cases and that is what he got. But if
equal attention is not given to other behavioral dimensions in the
pre-appointment analysis, the appointing President may experience
some unnecessary surprises later. This is not to suggest that a President can ever appoint Justices who will totally reflect his philosophical
position. Even if he could, changes in the Justices' positions over time
may be unpredictable. The question, of course, is how to "maximize."
The answer to the problem is not obscure. The executive should
first identify the behavioral dimensions likely to be of importance to
his administration and, in evaluating potential nominees, conduct a
thorough background analysis on each dimension. Other Presidents
may have been more cognizant of this principle than was Nixon,
though it is probable that none has been as systematic as we suggest
here. In making such an analysis, an additional challenge is to identify
correctly the dimensions on which the prospective nominee locates various types of judicial behavior. If this is not accomplished,
the theoretical antecedents of approved behavior may be misunderstood. Since these antecedents are of prime importance in predicting
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judicial decisionmaking in complex situations, failure here could be
serious. The Nixon administration appears to have failed this challenge
in three of four appointments. Seemingly, only Justice Powell has
permitted the criminal law context of the case to influence appreciably
the decision he will make. (While we have not investigated the
matter, it is conceivable that the pro-government voting patterns in
noncriminal cases of the other three appointees was neither sought
nor desired by Nixon.)
Finally, our data confirms that three of the Warren Court holdovers
have been unusually sympathetic to the criminal defendant as a litigant. Nixon's evaluation appears to have been accurate in this respect.
But Nixon and perhaps some social scientists do not appear to have
comprehended the broader theoretical explanation for the behavior
observed in such cases. The failure to do so may have diluted the
impact of the Nixon attack. Conceptually, the Warren Court Justices
could correctly take the view that their votes in criminal cases were
not a consequence of being "soft on criminals," but merely reflected
an overriding concern for the rights of the individual when in conflict with his government.

